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There is conflicting evidence on the importance of out-of-pocket medical expenditures as a risk to
financial security, particularly at older ages.  We revisit this question, focusing on health care spending
near the end of life using data from the Health and Retirement Study for the years 1998-2006.  We
address difficulties with missing values for various categories of expenditures, outliers, and variations
across individuals in the length of the reporting period.  Spending in the last year of life is estimated
to be $11,618 on average, with the 90th percentile equal to $29,335, the 95th percentile $49,907, and
the 99th equal to $94,310.   These spending measures represent a substantial fraction of liquid wealth
for decedents.  Total out-of-pocket expenditures are strongly positively related to wealth and weakly
related to income.  We find evidence for a mechanism by which wealth could plausibly buy health:
large expenditures on home modifications, helpers, home health care, and higher-quality nursing homes,
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The financial impact of catastrophic out-of-pocket health care expenditures appears with 
alarming frequency in the national media (e.g., Trejos, 2008; New York Times, 2008), and there 
is strong evidence that average out-of-pocket expenditures are growing over time (Paez, et al., 
2009).  Most recently, Webb and Zhivan (2010) using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
data, estimate that 5 percent of households now retiring may face out-of-pocket medical 
expenses of one-half million dollars or more.  The rapid erosion of employer-provided retiree 
health insurance for current baby boomers and forecasted increases in health care costs will 
likely make out-of-pocket burdens even larger in the years to come (Fronstin, 2006). 
However, despite the anecdotal evidence and repeated stories in the popular press, these 
out-of-pocket expenditures are often elusive and difficult to uncover in survey data.  McGarry 
and Schoeni (2005) reported just $2,500 average spending per year in the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) for people who were not near death and  French and Jones (2004) found that only a 
very small fraction of households experience catastrophic health care shocks.  More recently, De 
Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) found evidence of high out-of-pocket expenditures, but these 
arise among single people at very old ages and among high income households.  
We return to these issues using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 
1998-2006 to understand better the distribution and risk of out-of-pocket medical expenses as 
people approach death.  There are several challenges in measuring the empirical risks arising 
from such costs.  First, there are a large number of non-responses or bracketed responses where 
proxy respondents – typically children or spouses of the deceased – don’t know the exact amount 
of spending but provide a range (say nursing home expenses between $2,000 and $10,000, or 
more than $25,000).  Imputations in these cases are clearly necessary, but made difficult by the 2 
 
sparseness of the data in some ranges on a year by year basis.  We therefore harness continuous 
data from all six waves (1998-2006) of the HRS to develop more robust imputations.  
Second, we adjust for a bias in measuring the variation or “risk” of out-of-pocket 
spending that arises because of the HRS survey design.  Core surveys are fielded every two years 
and an exit survey is administered to proxies after the death of a respondent. Most questions in 
the exit interview ask about spending for the period of time elapsed between the last interview 
and the date of death, so expenditures will vary with the time to death.  For people who happen 
to die soon after their last (core) interview, spending will be relatively low, while for those who 
survive for nearly the entire two year window, expenditures will be large. Although measures of 
average expenditures in the sample may be unbiased, the variable reporting period will tend to 
overstate the variance and inferences drawn from the tails of the distribution will be invalid.  We 
correct for these biases by normalizing spending quantiles (and means) to a common 12-month 
period.
1  We also pay particular attention to the extent to which spending rises in the last few 
months of life – a period of time often missed in traditional survey questionnaires—and adjust 
our scaling appropriately.    
Third, we quantify the importance of large reported “outlier” measures for out-of-pocket 
spending paying considerable attention to potential reporting and coding errors.  We walk the 
fine line between Type 1 error – dropping a large reported spending amount when it is in fact 
true, and Type 2 error – accepting a large reported value as fact when the respondent (or proxy) 
misunderstood the question or misreported the response.   Rather than exclude individuals who 





reasonably be and cap expenditures at these limits. As well, we consider sensitivity analysis to 
outliers by capping amounts at different percentiles of spending.  We note that the correct 
treatment of these rare and potentially large spending events is particularly important for health 
care costs, because it is just such high-cost events that are disproportionately important for 
financial security.  We are reassured by finding that our HRS aggregate estimates of out-of-
pocket spending for ages 65 and over agree well with estimates from the National Medical 
Expenditures Accounts (Hartman et al., 2004).
 2   
Finally, we consider the normative implications of out-of-pocket spending by considering 
what types of outlays are most closely associated with wealth and income. De Nardi, French, and 
Jones (2010) have shown that out-of-pocket spending is highly dependent on income and we 
seek to assess the extent to which this pattern represents spending on consumption above and 
beyond medical expenditures—say purchasing plush living arrangements in a high end assisted 
care facility—rather than spending for additional medical attention.   
The results suggest that out-of-pocket expenditures near death are considerable, with an 
average of $12,120 (in 2006 dollars) per person in our sample, or $11,618 when scaled to 
represent the last year of life.  However, there is considerable variance, with the 12-month 90
th 
percentile equal to $29,335 and the 99
th percentile equal to $94,310.   
Where is all this spending going?  The largest single category is nursing home and 
hospital expenditures, which average $4,731 in the last year of life, of which about two-thirds is 
for nursing home care.  Not surprisingly, the distribution of expenses is highly skewed, with a 
                                                            
2 Hurd and Rohwedder (2009) reach different conclusions, suggesting that the HRS survey may overstate out-of-
pocket spending relative to other surveys of health care spending such as the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS).  We explore this issue below.  
 4 
 
median of zero, a 95
th percentile of $27,770, and a 99
th percentile of $75,902.  Other important 
sources of spending are for insurance ($1,746), prescription drugs ($1,496), home health care 
and helpers ($1,966 combined), and “non-medical” spending to make houses accessible ($721).  
Out-of-pocket expenditures are higher for high-income quartiles ($14,269 versus $9,046 
for the lowest quartile of income), but the partial impact of income on out-of-pocket spending is 
diminished considerably in a regression model. Differences in spending by wealth quartile are 
much larger than income differences with spending in the top wealth quintile equal to $18,232 
compared to $7,173 in the bottom.   These differences appeared to be driven mostly by greater 
spending for nursing homes, as well as for helpers, home health care, and other sources of 
spending that likely help maintain the independence of people living at home.    
Our results are therefore consistent with a more nuanced version of the two extreme 
stories of out-of-pocket spending noted above.  Health care expenditures represent a numerically 
large and potentially important drain on financial resources, particularly for households as time 
of death nears. However, the large wealth-elasticity (and more modest income-elasticity) 
suggests that some of this spending may serve to “buy” independence or represent other forms of 
consumption. This spending is likely to include a health component; evidence presented 
elsewhere suggests that these additional services could themselves have a positive impact on 
health outcomes (McCorkle, et al., 2000; Mor, et al., 2004), pointing to one mechanism by which 







II. Evidence on Out-of-Pocket Health Care Expenditures  
There is mixed evidence on how out-of-pocket medical expenditures affect financial security.  
Perhaps the most publicized study, Himmelstein et al. (2005), was based on a survey of 
households which had gone through bankruptcy hearings.  Roughly half of the sample cited out-
of-pocket expenditures as a possible cause of their bankruptcies, suggesting that out-of-pocket 
medical expenses are extremely burdensome.  However, the survey defined relevant 
expenditures as expenditures of $1000 or more.  And, as Dranove and Millenson (2006) point 
out, this is not a very high barrier, and many households spend more for their annual insurance 
premiums alone.  Using an alternative definition, Dranove and Millenson estimate a more 
plausible yet still sizeable figure, attributing up to 17 percent of all bankruptcies, at least in part, 
to out-of-pocket medical expenses.  A Commonwealth Fund report (Merlis et al., 2006) 
highlighting the “growing strain” of out-of-pocket expenditures on family budgets found that just 
11 percent of households had expenses exceeding 10% of income. We note, however, that even 
many of these “large” expenditures may have little effect on lifetime well-being if they are 
limited to an isolated year. A large part of the burden is likely to stem from repeatedly high 
health care costs. 
Conversely, several studies have found larger levels of out-of-pocket spending in the 
Medicare population.  Although Medicare provides nearly universal coverage for people 65 and 
over, there are substantial gaps in that coverage. For many, these gaps are filled by privately 
purchased “medigap” insurance or by retiree health insurance. While these supplemental plans 
offer relatively complete coverage of the standard Medicare deductibles and copayments,
4 there 
                                                            
4  Medicare requires a modest deductible for doctor visits and a copayment for costs beyond this amount. Medicare 
does not cover the cost of the first day of hospital care, requires a significant copayment for days 61-90 and covers 6 
 
are important limitations to the protections provided by such policies, particularly the coverage 
of long term care needs. Even for individuals with the most generous “medigap” policies, both 
home health care services and nursing home stays must be paid for out of pocket unless the 
individual qualifies for benefits from the means-tested Medicaid program or purchases a separate 
(and expensive) long term care insurance policy.
5  
Gaps in the coverage of acute medical needs are likely to become increasingly important 
as the fraction of firms offering retiree health insurance falls. The Kaiser Foundation estimates 
that among large firms the percentage providing retiree coverage has fallen from 66 percent in 
1988 to 31 percent in 2008.
6 Among all firms, the percentage offering retiree health insurance is 
substantially lower with an estimated 13 percent providing retiree coverage in 2002 and likely 
even less today. Retirees without employer-provided coverage must purchase a medigap policy 
on their own, which can cost up to $200 a month for a 65 year old. Fronstin (2006) estimates that 
in present-value terms someone retiring at age 65 a decade hence could need as much as 
$400,000 to cover these premiums.  These studies suggest that the rise in health care cost growth, 
coupled with the erosion of retiree insurance from employers, will lead to rapid growth in out-of-
pocket expenses even if current costs are not so large.  
Finally, even with relatively generous health care coverage and supplemental policies, an 
individual may incur substantial non-medical costs associated with a health condition. Items like 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
nothing for days beyond 90 (after a fixed lifetime “reserve” of 60 days is used). For those with long hospital stays 
and no other coverage, these costs can be substantial.  Perhaps most importantly, Medicare covers neither home 
health care nor nursing home expenses except for brief periods of medically needed care (rehabilitation) following a 
hospital stay.   
5 Only 10 percent of the elderly have purchased long term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2005).  
6 http://ehbs.kff.org/images/abstract/7814.pdf.  The figure of 66 percent is for large firms (200 or more employees) 
that offer health insurance to those currently working. Ninety-nine percent of large firms offer health insurance. 7 
 
handicap ramps, grab bars and food to meet special dietary needs, can be expensive and must 
typically be borne by the individual himself.   
Despite these insurance gaps, previous studies have often failed to find very large health 
care spending “shocks.” For example, Goldman and Zissimopoulos (2003) found median out-of-
pocket spending among HRS respondents over a two-year period of just $920, with even the 95
th 
percentile of out-of-pocket expenditures reaching just $7,000—a significant amount for sure, but 
less than one might fear for the upper tail of the distribution.  However, the Goldman and 
Zissimopoulus estimates do not include the end of life cohorts, and their data are from the 1998 
survey when health care generally was less expensive than it might be today.
7  By contrast, we 
focus solely on the end-of-life “exit” sample.   
Most recently, De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) quantified expected out-of-pocket 
expenditures in the HRS for single elderly households and found elevated spending associated 
with high levels of income, particularly among the very old (e.g., those age 90 and above).  For 
example, for 95-year olds in the top income quintile, the estimated average spending was nearly 
$16,000.  (Expenditures in the lower part of the income distribution are likely to be lower in part 
because of the important role played by Medicaid in paying for nursing home and home health 
care for the elderly.)  De Nardi et al. showed further that the risk of high out-of-pocket 
expenditures helped to explain observed wealth accumulation, particularly among higher-income 
households who are unlikely to qualify for Medicaid coverage and may want to protect 






Webb and Zhivan (2010) consider out-of-pocket risks in a dynamic model.  Using the 
HRS data, they simulate potential spending outcomes for hypothetical 65-year-olds extending 
out to their (uncertain) deaths, and find very large levels of uninsured risk: their 95
th percentile 
household faces a present value of $311,000 in health care spending, or $570,000 when adding in 
the cost of long-term care. However, these estimates likely overstate the true risk for two 
reasons.  First, to capture the true risk of spending absent an insurance safety net, they assume 
that individuals never receive Medicaid benefits.  Yet for many people who simply cannot afford 
the cost of care, Medicaid represents a feasible if not preferred option (Ameriks et al., 2010). The 
potential value of Medicaid may also affect lifetime savings and distort the perception of 
available resources (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1995).  And second, some of the modeled 
“risk” may also reflect the income or wealth elasticity of spending on health care, independent of 
health shocks.  That is, the top 5
th percentile of spending is likely to include both people who are 
very sick and people who are  very wealthy and who choose to consume a great deal of 
expensive health services. And while Webb and Zhivan (2010) do not find that their results are 
sensitive to outliers, we acknowledge that outliers may be more of an issue in end-of-life care, a 
topic to which we return below. 
Finally, Hurd and Rohwedder (2009) have suggested an alternative explanation for why 
the risk of out-of-pocket expenditures may be overstated in studies using the HRS – that the 
expenditures reported in the survey itself are biased upward.  They address this concern in two 
ways.  First, they show that for the small group of people who report very high out-of-pocket 
spending, many do not have enough household income or wealth to pay these expenses.  The 
problem of measurement error, however, is endemic in wealth and income, and family 
contributions to medical bills may be poorly captured in the survey. It is thus difficult to 9 
 
determine why the budget constraint appears to be violated—whether it is the medical 
expenditures that are mis-measured or the resources themselves.   
The second objection raised by Hurd and Rohwedder is that aggregate spending in the 
HRS appears to be too high – as much as 60% overstated -- relative to other surveys such as the 
Medicare Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 
(MCBS).  It is true that the MEPS and the MCBS are much better than the HRS in measuring all 
costs paid on behalf of the individual (i.e. both out-of-pocket costs and those insurance payments 
which would normally be invisible to all but very alert patients who check their insurance 
company paperwork).  However, with respect to out-of-pocket costs in particular, the HRS asks 
about specific types of expenditures in more detail than do these other surveys, and allows 
people who are unsure about actual dollar amounts to provide a range for the expense—leading 
to more complete reporting. (For example, the HRS asks who helps the respondent with various 
tasks and whether and how much helpers are paid, providing a more accurate measure of the cost 
of in-home assistance than elsewhere.)Thus, there is the real possibility that rather than over-
estimating expenses, the HRS simply captures expenses not measured in other surveys. 
Furthermore, the MEPS and MCBS are both known to miss important components of 
out-of-pocket spending, while French and Jones (2004) found that HRS out-of-pocket spending 
was close to aggregate estimates after corrections for underreporting. More recently, Hartman et 
al. (2007) reported age-specific spending measures using the National Medical Expenditures 
Accounts (NMEA), which also adjusts for underreported components of out-of-pocket spending 
from the other survey data.  Their estimate of per capita spending for the over-65 population in 10 
 
2003/2004 was $2,170 on average.
8 Defining the 2004 HRS Core data in an equivalent manner 
yields a nearly identical annual estimate of $2,151.
9  Including the sample of HRS respondents 
who died in 2004 (net of insurance payments and non-medical payments) brings the aggregate to 
$2,347 per capita, just 8 percent above the NMEA estimate.
10  Based on these figures,  we do not 
believe there isevidence of a strong upward bias in the HRS out-of-pocket expenditures, a result 
echoed in Goldman and Zissimopoulos (2010).  Still, as Hurd and Rohwedder (personal 
communication) have pointed out, the national estimates of age-specific spending may 
themselves be subject to measurement error, making it difficult to determine a “gold-standard.”  
Finally, while the aggregates constructed from the HRS data may be approximately correct, the 
components of spending (in particular nursing home versus non-nursing home spending) may be 
measured with error (Sing, et al., 2006).   
 
III. Data  
Our data for this task come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a 














born between 1931 and 1941. These original respondents have been interviewed biennially ever 
since with the most recent data collected in 2008.
11 A separate cohort (the AHEAD cohort) of 
those born in 1921 or earlier was interviewed in 1993 and again in 1995.  In 1998 these two 
samples were merged and two additional cohorts were added making the sample population 
approximately representative of the U.S. population ages 50 or older. A refresher cohort was 
added in 2004 to maintain representation of the population in their 50s.  We restrict our analyses 
to data from 1998 to 2006 so that we have a full age range of individuals from which to draw and 
more consistent sets of questions with respect to health care costs. 
Another reason for considering just years since 1998 is that, as noted above, the original 
sample was restricted to the non-institutionalized population.  In the early years of data from any 
cohort, health care expenditures (both overall and out-of-pocket) are likely to be biased 
downward because those in nursing homes, who likely have the largest expenses, are excluded.
12  
Over the longer term, this bias is attenuated as the sample matured and the formerly non-
institutionalized elderly began to enter nursing homes.  
The HRS is unusual in that when sample members die, it conducts what is termed an 
“exit interview.” The exit interview is a survey administered to a surviving spouse (if available) 
or other knowledgeable individual (such as an adult child), and collects information about the 
deceased individual pertaining to the period of time since the previous “live” survey.
13 Because 







are central to our study and we focus our attention on them.  However, we rely on the prior core 
survey for information about income and wealth of the household.   
The HRS collects a great deal of information on financial status, health measures, and 
out-of- pocket medical expenses, all of which we use in our analyses. In an improvement over 
past surveys, the HRS uses a bracketing method to reduce the number of missing values. If a 
respondent does not know (or does not wish to provide) an answer to a particular question about 
the amount of a health care expenditure (or other dollar-denominated question), they are asked a 
series of questions as to whether the amount is greater than or less than a specific value. This 
strategy provides us with a specific range of values rather than a missing response. Although the 
exact amounts are still uncertain (and for some uses must be imputed) these brackets are vastly 
more useful than the missing values that characterize much of survey data, particularly in cases 
where proxy respondents may not know exact amounts. 
We examine nine separate components of spending: insurance premiums (including 
privately purchased health insurance, “medigap” plans, employer provided insurance, Medicare 
HMOs, Medicare Part B, and long term care insurance), prescription drugs, physician payments, 
hospital and nursing home care,
14 other medical care (including expenses not covered by 
insurance, such as medications, special food, equipment such as a special bed or chair, visits by 
doctors or other health professionals – and after 2002, special expenses such as in-home medical 
care/special facilities or services/in-home medical care),  home health care, informal “helper” 






hiring help for housekeeping or other household chores or for assisting with personal needs), and 
hospice care.   
Both the bracketed responses and the remaining missing values for individuals who 
cannot or will not provide even a range of values necessitate the use of an imputation strategy to 
provide exact values. While the HRS and RAND provide imputed values for many variables in 
the core interview for the full range of survey years, they ceased imputations for the exit 
interviews in 2000.  An important component of our analysis is thus the construction of these 
values.  
The imputation procedures and our methodology for handling outliers are central to our 
study.
15  Our primary objective was to ensure that the information provided in the survey ends up 
in the final dataset with as little ad hoc restrictions and exclusions as possible. We consider three 
of the key issues below.   
Reasonable caps on spending values.  Large reported values for specific spending 
measures pose a problem for researchers because it is often impossible to discern whether the 
answer was given in error or whether it represents a rare but very large actual cost.  Problems can 
also arise because of confusion about the appropriate time frame for the question. In the majority 
of cases respondents are asked to report out of pocket expenditures since the previous interview, 
but for a few expenditure items they are asked about monthly expenses (e.g. for helpers they are 
asked about payments in the last month and for prescription drugs, about average monthly 
payments). On the one hand, this change in the relevant period can confuse respondents and may 




expenditures, respondents report the total expense since the last interview, thus raising the 
prospect of Type 1 error – overstating medical expenses.  On the other hand, we know that out-
of-pocket expenditures are marked by a high degree of skewness, so ad hoc “second-guessing” 
the respondent might lead to Type 2 error – rejecting the high reported cost when it is in fact 
true.   
The first column of Table 1 provides a summary of the caps we use for spending 
measures that seem unreasonably high.
16 We based the $2,000 cap on monthly health insurance 
payments for long-term care on premiums available through the Federal Long Term Care 
Insurance Program.
17  There are fewer guidelines for pharmaceutical payments, but drug 
regimens for high-end specialty drugs such as Gleevic alone can run as much as $40,000 
annually, and so we set (somewhat arbitrarily) a cap of $5000 per month in out-of-pocket 
pharmaceutical spending.
18 (If we were to examine spending beyond 2006, we would want to 
limit pharmaceutical expenditures further because of the institution of Part D Medicare 
coverage.)  We have much less evidence on private-pay physicians, but choose a maximum 













Monthly maximum expenditures for helpers and home health care comes from the use of 
multiple-shift nursing care for (e.g.) people with advanced dementia.  We assume a maximum of 
$15,000 per month ($25 per hour times 20 hours per day times 30 days) for each category.  The 
average monthly rate in New York City (the most expensive region) for a private nursing home 
bed is equal to just under $12,000 per month,
19 so we view a $15,000 fee as a reasonable upper 
limit on what might be spent in a more expensive facility.  Hospital expenditures and other 
expenses can clearly exceed $15,000 monthly, but for consistency we simply set that as the 
maximum as well and use a cap of $30,000 when nursing home and hospital expenses were 
reported together.  (Recall that these are out of pocket costs incurred beyond what Medicare or 
other insurance has covered.) Finally, we set hospice care and non-medical spending to a 
monthly limit of $5,000.
20   
  One further problem is that questions about helpers and home health care refer to the 
month prior to death.  It seems unreasonable to expect that these expenses were incurred at the 
same rate stretching back to the previous interview, but it also seems unreasonable to assume 
these costs were incurred just for one month.  Based on a study of (post-1997) median length of 
stay for home health care Medicare patients (Murkofsky, 2003), we assume that both helpers and 









Table 1 further illustrates the impact of these adjustments on specific components of 
spending.
21  The caps matter the most for helpers (103 people out of 6631, or 1.6 percent), but 
the mean difference in the spending measure (between the uncapped and capped values) is just 
$157 because so few individuals report positive values.  Other important categories affected by 
the caps are health insurance (25 people, reducing the average by $193) and nursing home 
expenses (17 people, reducing average expenses by $424).
22  In sum, the caps reduce average 
spending by less than $1000 per person, but likely to scale back the variance by much more.  
Below, we consider the importance of further capping spending on the 95
th or 99
th percentile.   
Sparse Imputation Values: One of the strengths of the HRS’s questioning procedures for 
health care costs is its use of detailed categories of expenditures. This detailed probing likely 
captures more expenditure than would a general catch-all question and is useful to an analyst 
seeking to examine particular forms of spending. However, it also means that the distributions of 
spending for each of the underlying components are often plagued by small samples, particularly 
at the upper tails. In any given exit interview there are only 1200 or so deaths so for infrequent 
but important outcomes, such as the out of pocket expense associated with a stay in a nursing 













The thinness of the data makes it difficult to impute values using conditional means or a 
traditional hot-decking procedure.   In the cases in which a specific bracket is available, say that 
spending on a particular service was between $10,000 and $25,000, we might be comfortable 
with imputing a value equal to the midpoint ($17,500) or even the mean over continuous 
responses in the interval, despite it being based on a small number of continuous responses (i.e. 
the scope for error is relatively small when bounds are in place). However, there are many cases 
in which we have opened rather than closed brackets. Individuals could report that they spent 
more than (say) $25,000 on a health expense but not report an exact amount or any upper limit.  
Should we impute $26,000?  Or double that?  With relatively few decedents in any given year, 
there may not be more than a handful of people who report values above the upper break point 
for any given component of spending, making it extremely difficult to impute an overall 
conditional mean, much less one tailored to individual specifics such as age or insurance 
coverage.   
To deal with the sparseness of observations, we impute values based on a distribution 
constructed from a combined sample of exit interviews for all survey years, a much larger 
sample of 6,631. We first construct a combined file of exact dollar amounts for each spending 
category, with all measures adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and expressed in 2006 
dollars.  For everyone reporting a bracketed amount, we estimated the conditional mean for that 
bracket, including open ended brackets.  Because of inflation, the end-points of the brackets vary 
over time, and so for each specific set of brackets, a new conditional mean was estimated.  We 
then considered the more complex sets of questions – for example whether people reported 
positive amounts (but didn’t know the amount) in which case they were assigned the mean value 18 
 
conditional on a positive value, or whether people reported not knowing at all whether the 
expense was incurred, in which case they were assigned the unconditional mean.  
An example of the distribution is shown in Figure 1 for the (log) distribution of hospital 
and nursing home out-of-pocket expenditures for the entire sample, conditional on a positive 
amount.  These estimates include both imputed and actual estimates, and while there are clear 
spikes where imputations play a larger part (or reflect rounding by respondents), there is 
sufficient density of continuously reported variables to suggest a log-normal distribution that is 
not dominated by outliers.  
We recognize that in stacking data from all years of the survey to conduct our imputation 
procedure, we are missing any evolution over time in the distribution of expenditures. However, 
we believe that the potential bias introduced by this method is less of a problem than any bias 
introduced by relying solely on the few continuous data reports available in any particular year.  
We note that this procedure restricts our ability to assess growth in expenditures over time (other 
than that stemming from a rise in the number of individuals reporting values in the upper 
brackets or for those reporting actual expenses) and therefore do not provide a discussion of 
differences in spending by year.
23    
Time to Death: A final data issue which we note here is the differing length of time 
between interviews, particularly for exit interviews where the date of death might be just a few 
months after the last interview or as long as two years. If deaths are randomly distributed across 
a two year interval, the varying length of time will not affect our population averages. (The 
                                                            
23 We have considered using the stacked sample along with regression equations to control for individual 
characteristics, but even with the full complement of decedents any regression would be sensitive to outliers. 19 
 
average time elapsed, from the respondents’ final “live” interviews until their deaths, is 
approximately 15 months, with a median of 14 months.)   There will, however, be systematic 
variation in expenditures with those who die long after their last interview appearing to have 
higher end-of-life costs than dying soon after the last survey simply because the costs pertain to a 
longer time period.  
There may also be potential biases in reporting patterns as proxies may be more likely to 
misreport or forget completely about costs when the death occurred a year or more before, or 
because of upticks in spending very near death.  It is difficult to sort out the difference between 
forgetfulness and a diminished rate of out-of-pocket expenditures as one goes further back in 
time prior to the death.  And as we show, the flattening out of reported spending beyond a two-
year limit is suggestive of a sharp drop-off in recall for these proxies.  We present data that has 
been adjusted for a quartic in the number of months since the last interview, whether for mean 
expenditures or quantile regressions (to estimate weighted percentiles), where we set the number 
of months to 12.    
IV. Results   
We use data from the 1998—2006 exit interviews, with a combined sample of 6,631 
people (6,306 of whom have positive sampling weights). Table 2 presents summary statistics for 
the sample of decedents both combined and for individual years.  The sample of decedents is, 
unsurprisingly, quite old. The average age at death is 79.4, with just 12 percent of the decedents 
under the age of 65.  The fraction of men in the sample is somewhat below 50 percent, while 
average years of schooling are roughly 11 years, with a strong secular trend that rises from 10.6 
years (1998) to 11.6 years (2006).  The fraction of people who report their race as nonwhite 20 
 
ranges between 11 and 15 percent (depending on the year), while the percent Hispanic is 4.6 
percent over the entire period.   
Average out-of-pocket expenditures for the entire sample are $12,120.  There is some 
evidence of a rising trend over time (from $11,183 in 1998 to $14,451 in 2004) despite our 
imputation based on across year averages, but there is a marked decline between 2004 and 2006, 
to $12,954.  This decline is in part the consequence of a modest decline in out-of-pocket drug 
expenditures (probably more the consequence of a change in how the question is asked than in 
the introduction of Medicare Part D), but mostly because of an unusually high level of nursing 
home spending (conditional on admission) in 2004.   
Wealth and income from the most recent interview prior to death are reported in Table 2.  
Net worth exclusive of housing wealth averages $178,469, and including housing, $281,005.  
The peak wealth estimates were in 2000, and despite the subsequent downturn there is some hint 
of a modest positive trend over time.  The averages, of course, mask the considerable variation 
(and skewness) across individuals; the median value of net worth excluding housing is $24,706 
(not shown), and for total net worth including housing wealth, the median is $102,000.  There is 
less skewness in income, however; average income is $31,713, while median income is $19,177.   
Table 3a reports components of out-of-pocket expenditures and their mean, median, 90
th, 
95
th percentiles, and maximum amounts.  While mean spending is $12,120, median spending is 
just $5,175. Indeed, nearly 30 percent of respondents reported less than $100 in any out-of-
pocket expenditure.  (Whether this is because of under-reporting or a true lack of out-of-pocket 
costs is not entirely clear.)  For the 90
th percentile, spending was $29,790, the 95
th percentile 
$49,751, the 99
th $101,581 (not shown),  while the maximum was $331,825. The impact of 21 
 
extreme outliers on the mean was fairly modest; capping spending at the 99
th percentile amount 
reduced the mean to $11,690, while capping at the 95
th percentile reduced the mean to $10,400. 
As noted previously, nursing home and hospital out-of-pocket expenditures were the 
single largest category, with a mean of $4,731, and 95
th percentile expenditures equal to $26,136.  
Expenditures for insurance were less skewed (median of $990, mean of $2,096), while drug 




Payments to helpers for home-based care can account for substantial expenditures, 
although it is not a common expenditure category.
25  Fewer than one-quarter of the respondents 
paid money to someone who helped with tasks around the home, but the conditional mean is 
high, adding $1,281 to average expenses near death.  Given our assumption that helpers spent no 
more than 4 months prior to death with the households, this estimate is likely to underestimate 
the overall uncertainty arising from such costs.  Finally, hospice care is largely covered by 
Medicare, and thus its contribution to out-of-pocket expenditures is remarkably modest ($38 on 
average).   
The variation across individuals in these expenditures could be overstated given that the 











we’re collecting unusually high levels of spending) and people who died within a few months of 
the survey (so we only pick up modest levels of spending).  Figure 2 shows the association 
between total out-of-pocket expenditures and the time since the last core survey.  Also presented 
is the implicit incremental spending – that is, the difference between the current average 
expenditures for people who died (say) between 7 and 9 months, minus expenditures for those 
who died between 4 to 6 months.  (Thus we assume that the two groups are otherwise identical 
except for the time since the last interview – perhaps a strong assumption, but not an 
unreasonable one given the randomness of the interview dates relative to death).   
Figure 2 demonstrates that a large fraction of spending in the last two years occurs in the 
last 6 months, although spending continues to climb to an average of nearly twenty thousand 
dollars for people whose last interviews were more than 2 years prior to death.  That incremental 
spending falls off so much in later months is suggestive of recall bias, but further modeling 
would be required to measure and correct for recall bias.   
To adjust for these clear differences in expenditures by months since the last interview, 
we present results that correspond to Table 3a of the distribution of spending, but adjust for the 
number of months since the interview by using a quartic in months, and setting the value(s) equal 
to 12 months prior to death.  Regression results (from both weighted least squares and weighted 
quantile regressions) are presented in Table 3b.  The mean values are similar, and the magnitude 
of the shrinkage at the 95
th percentile is quite modest or even non-existent in some cases.  The 
impact of the shrinkage is greatest at the very top of the distribution – for example, as noted 
above the 99
th percentile of unadjusted total out-of-pocket expenditures is $101,581, but the 
adjusted measure is $94,310.  In sum, these 12-month measures are more accurate estimates of 23 
 
the true distribution of out-of-pocket expenditures, but even after these corrections, the true 
variation in medical expenditures is still substantial.  
We next consider the association between out-of-pocket expenditures and wealth and 
income quintiles.  Table 4a presents detailed spending measures by wealth quintile, and Table 4b 
shows equivalent measures by income quintile.  The mean values are not exactly the same as in 
the aggregates reported in Table 3 because the sample changes somewhat due to missing values 
for either income (resulting in a sample size of 5,775) or wealth (N = 6,089).  Total out-of-pocket 
expenditures for decedents rise from $7,173 in the bottom wealth quintile to $18,233 in the top 
quintile, an increase of 154 percent.  All measures of spending exhibit a positive wealth 
elasticity, but some are larger in magnitude than others.  For example, while nursing home and 
hospital expenditures are nearly double for the highest quintile compared to the lowest quintile of 
wealth ($6,521 versus $3,461), the largest proportional differences arise in care provided at 
home, for example home care ($1,334 versus $383), non-medical expenditures ($1,416 versus 
$335) and helper costs ($2,601 compared to $547).     
There are similar associations between spending and income, but as shown in Table 4b, 
they are much less pronounced.  Overall spending rises from $9,046 in the bottom quintile to 
$14,269 in the top quintile, with patterns similar to those for wealth apparent with respect to 
spending on home care, non-medical care, and helper costs.  Also of interest are the categories 
that are not associated with income, for example hospital and nursing home expenses; these are 
$4,022 for the lowest income level and $4,471 for the highest.  In part this is because lower 
income decedents were more likely to have experienced a nursing home admission (11 percent 
compared to 7 percent for the highest income group) increasing the unconditional mean.  That 
said, it does not appear that one commonly offered explanation for income-based differences in 24 
 
out-of-pocket spending – the use of luxury nursing homes – receives much support from the 
data.
26    
We further consider a multiple regression model of spending as a function of observable 
characteristics to disentangle separate effects of income and wealth on expenditures.  We control 
for sex, race, Hispanic identification, a quadratic in schooling, a cubic in age, and (as before) 
control for months prior to the previous core interview.  Figure 3 presents just the predicted 
measures of out-of-pocket total expenditures, evaluated at the mean values of the explanatory 
variables and the assumption of a 12-month value for months since last interview.  The 
regression results indicate that out-of-pocket expenditures are roughly twice as high in the top 
wealth quintile compared to the bottom wealth quintile (95 percent confidence intervals are 
shown by the whiskers in the diagram), but that the impact of income is no longer significantly 
different from zero.  In sum, the estimates support the hypothesis that out-of-pocket expenditures 
are determined primarily by wealth on hand, and not by late-life income flows.  This result 
accords with estimates presented in Smith (1999) that demonstrates a significant positive 
relationship between wealth and health status in the HRS, but no such relationship for retirement 
income and health.  
Finally, we present raw measures of out-of-pocket expenditures broken down by wealth 
quintiles and by age group.  We find a strong association between spending and age, as also 
noted by De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010), with a widening distribution of spending with 
wealth quintile at older ages.  In Figure 4a, for example, end-of-life spending for those dying 





quintile, even average spending at age 90+ is over $30,000 per year.  And while this type of 
pattern is shown also for nursing home and hospitals expenditures (Figure 4b), it is most 
pronounced for home-related services – the sum of home health care, helpers, non-medical costs, 
and other medical expenses.  While such spending barely budges with age for the lowest wealth 
quintile, it rises more than three-fold (from an average of $3,448 to $11,594) by age for the 
highest wealth quintile. This pattern is consistent with a greater likelihood of sudden-onset 
illnesses for younger decedents, rather than long (and expensive) chronic illnesses among the 
oldest old.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Previous studies of out-of-pocket expenditures have generally found low levels of 
average expenditures but a high degree of skewness in the distribution (Palumbo, 1999; Feenberg 
and Skinner, 1994; French and Jones, 2004).  In part, the low mean values were the consequence 
of older data and generally lower levels of health care spending in those years.  Our results 
suggest that, at least for the period 1998-2006, out-of-pocket expenditures near the end of life are 
both pervasive and large, particularly for higher wealth groups and at older ages.  Even after 
adjusting for the variable length of time the decedents are in the sample, average out-of-pocket 
expenditures in the last 12 months of life are $11,618, with a median of $5,061 and a 95
th 
percentile measure equal to $49,907.  These numbers at least appear to be large relative to the 
decedent’s median non-housing wealth ($24,706).     
We have also found a strong wealth elasticity of spending, which adds some nuance to 
the notion of health expenditure shocks.  Given that our sample consists of recent decedents, it 
would be hard to argue that the health “shock” experienced by the lowest wealth individual is 26 
 
much different from that shock experienced by the highest wealth group.  It may therefore be 
tempting to view all of these wealth-elastic expenditure choices as “luxury” spending, like 
purchasing a Lexus rather than a Kia.
27  In this view, the low-wealth-quintile spending measure 
would represent the “true” shock to spending and all the rest is deemed endogenous, and thus 
perhaps not relevant for coverage under social insurance programs.   
However, it may well be that the lowest wealth group as unable to afford uninsured but 
medically valuable commodities– as one might expect for a group reporting zero median net 
wealth and an income of less than $10,000—and that no spending is therefore observed for these 
needed items. Similarly, those with low income or wealth may only be able to afford lower 
quality care.   For example, Mor et al. (2004) showed much lower levels of quality – as measured 
by the prevalence of high-risk pressure ulcers, restraint use, and lack of pain control – in nursing 
homes catering largely to Medicaid patients.
 28   
Indeed, the ultimate luxury good appears to be the ability to retain independence and 
remain in one’s home (perhaps altered to permit easy navigation), through the use of (paid) 
helpers and home health care assistance.  Once admitted to the nursing home, a further benefit of 
assets is the ability to eschew Medicaid, which many would prefer to avoid (Ameriks, et al., 
2010), and to have the ability to purchase more comfortable living arrangements.  These types of 
expenses are generally not amenable to insurance coverage, and thus it is not surprising that only 
those with sufficient accumulated wealth can afford high levels of spending; levels that are large 






elderly may continue to hold (or even accumulate) wealth as a hedge against uninsured costs 
surrounding expensive end of live care-giving for themselves or their spouse.      
The independent living arrangements facilitated by wealth could also have long-term 
effects on survival and functioning. Although the evidence on this issue is sparse, one 
randomized trial did suggest that specialized home nursing improves survival following cancer 
treatment (McCorkle, et al., 2000).  While this result applies to a fairly specialized form of home 
care, it is consistent with the idea that wealth can translate into better health through these types 
of (uninsured) mechanisms. Certainly many patients themselves would testify that they will fare 
better if allowed to remain in their own home. Finally, items such as special food or home 
accommodations likely affect health directly, for example by reducing falls or other injuries. 
There are several important limitations of this study.  First, we recognize the inherent 
uncertainty surrounding many of the assumptions about limits on spending, whether monthly 
caps or the length of time we might expect spending to have occurred (e.g., for helpers).  That 
said, we believe that even with our conservative imputations, there is strong evidence of 
substantial pockets of out-of-pocket expenditures in the data, estimates that are consistent with 
aggregate measures of out-of-pocket spending. Furthermore, large differences exist by ability to 
pay. Even if we cap total out-of-pocket spending at the 95
th percentile value to limit the impact 
of outliers, we find dramatic differences in spending by wealth.  
Second, we have not adequately captured non-monetary care-giving by family members 
that may be provided out of affection, or alternatively, motivated by inheritances or other 
transfers.  Past studies suggest that value of this unpaid care is far greater than that of formal paid 
care. Furthermore, this unpaid caregiving may well be concentrated in the lower tails of the 28 
 
income and wealth distributions and may offset some of the differences we observe with respect 
to expenditures on in-home care.  
Third, our focus on end-of-life spending reflects only the last year or so of life, and does 
not capture lifetime risks (as in Palumbo, 1999; Webb and Zhivan, 2010; or De Nardi, French, 
and Jones, 2010).  Nor do we capture the important risk of disabling health shocks for those still 
working.  During a 10-year period for people in their 50s, seven out of ten adults developed 
health problems, lost their jobs, or lost spouses owing to divorce or death (Johnson, Mermin, and 
Uccello, 2006; also see Smith, 2005).  Such losses would lead to much diminished wealth and 
income as just as individuals are approaching retirement age.  
Despite these qualifications, we believe that this study sheds important light on the role 
of medically related expenditures in affecting the resources of the elderly. This issue is of 
substantial policy concern particularly as we consider health care reform, changes in the 
provision of care, and the much debated question whether those retiring today have adequate 
savings and insurance to cover future health care needs (Skinner, 2007). Understanding the 
nature of risks and more importantly, the health-based value of these out-of-pocket expenditures 
– as opposed to their pure consumption value -- is central to designing future social insurance 
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Figure 2:  Average Out-of-Pocket Expenditures by Number of Months Between Last 
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Note: Estimates are adjusted using mean values of sex, race, Hispanic identification, a quadratic 
in years of schooling, cubic in age, and quartic in the months between the last interview 
and the time of death (set to 12 months).  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are 
included.  
 















Figure 4c: Home-Related Services (Home Health Care, Helpers, Non-Medical Costs, Other 






Table 1: Monthly Caps on Expenditures 
   














Health Insurance  2,000  .0038  25/6631  2063  1870 
Rx 5,000  .0009  6/6631  1715  1628 
Doctor 5,000  .0002  1/6631  390  389 
Home care  15,000  .0006  4/6631  686  652 
Helpers 15,000*  .0155  103/6631  1330  1173 
Other  & Special  15,000  .0002  1/6631  388  388 
Hospital + Nursing 
Home  30,000 .0019  5/2599  3840  3739 
Hospital 15,000  .0007  3/4032  745  667 
Nursing home  15,000  .0042  17/4032  4807  4383 
Hospice 5,000  .0000  0/6631  51  51 
Non-medical 5,000  .0003  2/6631  871 846 
          
Note: * Maximum of 4 months.  Total samples may be larger than those used in analysis because 
of additional selection criteria 36 
 
Table 2: Variable Means, Total and by Year 1998-2006 




















Age at death 
  
79.4 81.2 79.3 78.4 80.3 78.2
Sex (1=male) 
 
0.478 0.458 0.491 0.483 0.457 0.497
Years of schooling 
 
11.1 10.6 10.9 11.1 11.3 11.6
Nonwhite 
 
0.134 0.114 0.130 0.152 0.131 0.140
Hispanic 
 
0.046 0.035 0.038 0.057 0.043 0.053
Birth-year 
 
1921.6 1915.5 1919.6 1922.6 1922.8 1926.8
OOP expenditures  
  
12,120 11,183 10,610 11,396 14,451 12,954
Net worth (less house 
equity)  in prior period 
178,469 165,669 204,122 178,312 153,664 187,990
Net worth in prior period 
 
281,005 235,321 326,529 283,570 252,988 299,829
Income in prior period 
 
31,713 20,286 34,506 33,726 33,322 35,681
Notes: Sample sizes of specific means for net worth and income are slightly smaller in each year (and for the total) because of missing 
data.  All wealth and income data are for the household in the prior interview wave.   
 37 
 
  Table 3a: Distribution of Expenditure by Category for Exit Interviews 
 
 
    Variable        Mean     Median     p75       p90       p95   Maximum 
__________________________________________________________________________
Total OOP         12,120     5,175    13,681    29,790    49,751   331,825
Insurance          2,096       990     2,633     5,111     7,097    54,503
Drugs              1,761       448     2,400     4,353     6,000   129,998
Physician            353         0       387     1,137     1,211    51,957
Nursing Home/Hosp  4,731         0     2,238    11,190    26,136   285,645
Other & Special      384         0         0       702     1,624    48,492
Home Health          687         0         0       722     2,565   254,997
Non-Medical          790         0         0       604     2,979   115,000
Helpers            1,281         0         0     4,084     8,190    60,000
Hospice               38         0         0         0         0    70,000
__________________________________________________________________________
 
Table 3b: Distribution of Expenditure by Category for Exit Interviews,  
Normalized to a Twelve-Month Period 
 
    Variable        Mean     Median     p75       p90      p95      p99   
________________________________________________________________________ 
Total OOP         11,618     5,061    12,890    29,335    49,907   94,310  
Insurance          1,746       914     2,301     3,274     4,766   21,602  
Drugs              1,496       580     2,384     2,811     5,082   11,679  
Physician            335         0       462     1,143     1,218    3,120  
Nursing Home/Hosp  4,975         0     2,303    12,046    27,770   75,902 
Other Medical        387         0         0       728     2,040    7,382  
Home Health          617         0         0       742     2,565    9,968  
Non-Medical          721         0         0       687     2,761   13,749  
Helpers            1,249         0         0     5,009     9,307   20,290  




Table 3b reports fitted values for a 12-month period from the prior interview period using a quartic in months. 
Definition of categories:  Insurance premiums include premiums for Medicare Part B and long term care 
insurance as well as medigap and other privately purchased policies.  Physician includes out-patient care in 
2002-2006 interviews. Nursing home and hospital out-of-pocket expenditures are combined, but are available 
separately in 2002-2006 interviews.  The Other Medical category includes “special” and “other medical” 
categories. Special being in-home medical care/special facilities or services, and other being “other expenses 
not covered by insurance, such as medications, special food, equipment such as a special bed or chair, visits by 
doctors or other health professionals, or other costs” Non-Medical is payments for items “such as modifying 









  Wealth |   Total    Insurance   Drugs     Physician  N.Home     Other     Home     Non-      Helper    Hospice 
 Quintile|                                             & Hosp.  & Special   Care     Medical    Costs     
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       1 |     7,173       937       971       217     3,461       306       383       335       547        17 
       2 |     9,118     1,453     1,558       256     3,806       252       359       607       813        13 
       3 |    11,765     2,360     1,834       406     4,550       366       636       553       978        82 
       4 |    14,454     2,591     2,330       422     5,458       424       753     1,028     1,431        18 
       5 |    18,233     3,159     2,148       424     6,521       571     1,334     1,416     2,601        60 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 









  Income     Total    Insurance   Drugs     Physician  N.Home     Other     Home     Non-      Helper    Hospice 
 Quintile                                              & Hosp.  & Special   Care     Medical    Costs     
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       1 |     9,046     1,127     1,382       210     4,022       301       371       620       985        28 
       2 |    10,347     1,681     1,495       243     4,358       308       494       655     1,100        13 
       3 |    14,002     2,261     1,788       336     6,316       339       725       985     1,229        23 
       4 |    12,545     2,564     2,200       383     4,092       369       645     1,032     1,227        32 
       5 |    14,269     2,832     1,946       527     4,471       600     1,276       680     1,911        26 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Notes: Definitions of specific categories in Table 4.  Sample sizes are different (N = 6089 for the wealth quintiles and N = 5775 for 
the income quintiles) owing to missing values for wealth and income; hence the totals do not necessarily correspond to the statistics 
for the full sample. 